ABSTRACT
Stress tests are forward-looking in the sense that they aim to measure the sensi vity of a por olio, fi nancial ins tu on, or the whole system to adverse shocks, which could have a signifi cant nega ve impact should they occur. The aim of a stress testing exercise is thus to assess the poten al eff ect of those shocks on banks' capital adequacy and the need for correc ve ac on to increase resilience. Over me, stress tests came to be recognized as a powerful tool not only in risk management, but also in macropruden al and micropruden al policies (see Figure 1 below). The FSAPs men oned earlier are a good example of a macropruden al applica on. The IMF stress tests tend to focus on severe hypothe cal scenarios, tes ng the fi nancial systems' vulnerability to a major deteriora on of the macroeconomic environment. The results of such tests generally do not require ac on on the side of the banks' management, but are used to inform the authori es of the systemic risks present (Jobst et al., 2013) . Micropruden al stress tests are typically conducted to examine the soundness of individual fi nancial ins tu ons and can result in recapitaliza on requirements or even bank restructuring (Jobst et al., 2013) . For example, in 2010 the Federal Reserve launched the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) program to evaluate capital adequacy and internal capital planning processes of large banking groups (FRS website).
II. Stress tes ng approaches: literature review
We shall give a brief overview of the exis ng approaches to banking system stress tes ng before moving on to discuss the methodology applied by the NBU. Numerous approaches to conduc ng stress tests have been developed over the years, and various classifi ca on schemes exist. Regulators across countries have come up with their own stress tes ng designs, built on interna onal best prac ces with local varia ons catering to country-specifi c idiosyncrasies (for an example, see Table 1 ). Jobst et al (2013) .
When it comes to par cular types of risks, solvency remains at the forefront of the stress tes ng exercises, although more and more a en on is being given to developing models for tes ng liquidity, market, and systemic risks, as well as dynamic interac on between various types of risks. A stress test may es mate the eff ect of a single risk factor or model the impact of a group of risks ac ng simultaneously. The fi rst approach is in essence a sensi vity analysis, the second -a scenario analysis. The scenarios selected may be based on historical data, sta s cal analysis, or be purely hypothe cal (Blaschke et al., 2001) .
The IMF provides the following broad classifi ca on of stress tes ng approaches, dividing them into three categories: accoun ng-based approaches (including the balance-sheet approach), market-price based approaches, and macro-fi nancial approaches (Čihak and Ong, 2014; Schmieder and Schumacher, 2014) .
The accoun ng-based approach, as the name suggests, uses accoun ng data from fi nancial statements of individual ins tuons or systems (Čihak and Ong, 2014) . One of its most widely used varia ons is the balance-sheet approach, which relies on informa on obtained from fi nancial statements, such as the income statements and off -balance sheet reports, as well as the balance sheet itself. This method is popular due to input data availability, fi nancial statements being prepared regularly and usually publicly disclosed (Čihak and Ong, 2014) . Addi onally, fi nancial statement informa on is quite standardized, which allows for peer comparison and system-wide applica on. Due to the granularity of the data, it is possible to use both topdown and bo om-up approaches, iden fying risk drivers at the level of par cular ins tu ons as well as for the system overall (Schmieder and Schumacher, 2014) . The network approach allows for tackling vulnerabili es that arise from systemic linkages between fi nancial ins tu ons opera ng in either domes c or global fi nancial markets. Network analysis is best combined with regular stress tes ng exercises in order to complement the assessment of the vulnerabili es of a par cular ins tu on with analysis of the rela onships between ins tu ons and possible contagion eff ects (Espinosa-Vega and Sole, 2014).
As popular as they are, accoun ng-based stress tests have drawbacks stemming from diff erences in accoun ng standards, risks of fi nancial statement manipula on, and the backward-looking nature of the reports (Chan-Lau, 2014 ). An alterna ve approach relies on the market's percep on of risks, as refl ected in the prices of fi nancial instruments rather than accoun ng fi gures (Čihak and Ong, 2014) . The Equity indicators-based approach uses informa on gauged from security prices in secondary markets. Although bonds and credit default swaps are a preferred source of informa on, their prices being more directly refl ec ve of the issuer's creditworthiness, equi es are more commonly used due to their higher liquidity and coverage. Credit default probabili es es mated from security prices can be used to assess losses under various stress scenarios (Kapinos and Mitnik, 2015) . The Extreme value theory (EVT) approach focuses on iden fying extreme events (tail risks) that could have an adverse impact on the fi nancial system or separate ins tu ons. EVT uses sta s cal and econometric models to assess spillover eff ects during a tail-risk event (Mitra, 2014) . Con ngent claims analysis is an approach based on a combina on of balance-sheet informa on and forward-looking informa on from equity markets. It es mates credit risk based on the impact of changes in asset values related to payments on debt liabili es (Gray et al., 2014) .
The Macro-fi nancial approach promotes a holis c view on fi nancial stability, incorpora ng individual ins tu ons' soundness, their interac ons between each other, and the overall economy. This method considers the links between the fi nancial and the nonfi nancial sectors of the economy and can be implemented based on both accoun ng and market-based data (Čihak and Ong, 2014; Maechler, 2014) . Stress tests can be performed using either a bo om-up or a top-down approach. A bo om-up approach assumes that banks perform their own stress-tests, with the supervisor (regulator) providing guiding principles and verifying results. According to the IMF, with banks having be er knowledge of their own exposures, the results of a bo om-up approach are more informa ve as to the risks and vulnerabili es faced by the fi nancial ins tu ons (Blaschke et al., 2001) . When the regulator uses a centralized approach to stress tes ng, performing the analysis based on a single methodology and data submi ed by banks, the approach is top-down. Mandatory stress tes ng as a regulatory requirement is rela vely novel and the lack of formal prescrip ons for stress test design has led to the prolifera on of scien fi c research on this topic, with the majority of studies focused largely on the top-down approach and with bo om-up methods receiving less coverage (Kapinos and Mitnik, 2015) .
The stress tes ng framework usually consists of several models -a major one complemented with auxiliary satellite models. As was demonstrated by the global fi nancial crisis, the stress tes ng methodologies previously used were not adequate for evalua ng the fi nancial system's stability and robustness. In order to overcome the exposed weaknesses, new techniques were introduced, among them a heuris c proposed by Taleb et al. (2012) which allows assessment of how vulnerable a bank (or government) is to underes ma on of tail risks. According to Taleb et al. (2012) , missing convexi es or non-lineari es in outcomes may lead to underes ma on of the impact of adverse shocks, and hence create serious fragili es in the fi nancial system. Hence, the authors propose a heuris c that measures the sensi vity of the outcome (gains/losses) to a change in the stress applied. A fi nancial ins tu on would then be deemed fragile to higher vola lity if the rela onship between the increase in the shock applied and the losses is found to be non-linear, which is o en the case for complex and interconnected markets (Taleb et al., 2012) . Banks submit their projecons, BoE uses those submissions as a star ng point for the stress test, making its own adjustments. Going forward, BoE intends to give more weight to its in-house models (topdown approach).
Top-down
Supervisory stress tes ng* NA
Coverage criteria
BHCs** with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more and nonbank fi nancial companies designated by the FSOC.
Sample of banks covering at least 50% of the na onal banking sector in each EU Member State in terms of total consolidated assets (as of the end of 2013).
Include all PRA-regulated banks and building societies with total retail deposits greater than £50 billion. Baseline scenario, annual cyclical scenario, and an addi onal scenario intended to probe the resilience of the system to risks that may not be neatly linked to the fi nancial cycle (biennial exploratory scenario)****.
Ins tu ons

Descrip on of the stress tes ng approach
Calculated projec ons of a BHC's balance sheet, riskweighted assets (RWAs), net income, and resul ng regulatory capital ra os under stress scenarios. The four regulatory capital ra os in DFAST 2015 are common equity er 1, er 1 riskbased capital, total risk-based capital, and er 1 leverage.
Assessed the impact of risk drivers on the solvency of banks (focus on solvency and market risks) in terms of Common equity er 1 capital raos.
Uses the EBA proposed framework with certain adjustments, including the following:
• Sta c balance sheet assump on (EBA) vs. evolu on of the size and composi on of the balance sheet throughout the scenario (BoE).
• Income caps and expense fl oors (EBA) vs. no such constraints (BoE).
• Use of addi onal models and analysis: BoE's stress test uses a set of analy cal tools in addi on to par cipating banks' own projec ons to assess the impact of scenarios on banks' profi tability and capital ra os.
Disclosure
Detailed disclosure of individual bank results (required under the Dodd-Frank Act)***. Sources: Bank of England (2015) , Bank of England (2014 ), FRS website, EBA (2014 , EBA (2015) , FRS (2015) 
III. NBU approach to stress-tes ng Ukrainian banking system
On 24 April 2015, the NBU ini ated a diagnos c study of the Ukrainian banking system as a mandatory part of the Ukraine-IMF coopera on program under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement. The goal of this study was to evaluate the quality of banks' asset por olios and es mate their poten al capital needs over the three-year period of 2015-2017. The fi rst part of the exercise consisted of an asset quality review (AQR) laying the founda on for the second part -the stress test. Data obtained from on-site teams (inspec ons) was used as a major input for the stress tests, along with data from NBU registers and the banks themselves.
Design of the stress test
The NBU stress test was focused primarily on assessing Ukrainian banks' solvency under the stress scenario applied, evalua ng credit risk (including on-and off -balance sheet exposures, posi ons on the banking and trading books), and interest rate spreads risk, currency risk and risk of large exposure concentra on in loan por olios.
The stress test covered the 20 largest Ukrainian banks and was run at the highest level of domes c consolida on, the scope of consolida on being the perimeter of the banking group. The exercise included domes c exposures, with special a en on given to large banking and trading book posi ons. All data inputs were fi xed as of the date 31 March 2015 and projec ons were made for the three-year forecast period of 2015-2017. Unlike the more common mul -scenario approach, the NBU used a single baseline macroeconomic scenario, which was developed in coopera on with the IMF. The ra onale behind the decision to give up adverse stressed scenarios was the fact that Ukraine was already at the nadir of an economic crisis, thus making applica on of addi onal macroeconomic shocks an unrealis cally severe scenario. The baseline scenario used assumed a gradual recovery of the Ukrainian economy star ng in 2016.
Projec ons of some of the key variables are presented in the table below. Approaching the end of 2015, it is clear that the macroeconomic projec ons for the relevant year were in line with actual developments. The expected result of the exercise consisted of es ma ng the need for addi onal Tier 1 capital and total regulatory capital for the 2015-2017 period for each of the 20 banks, with subsequent submission of capitaliza on plans.
Model framework
The NBU used a balance-sheet stress tes ng approach, relying on informa on provided by banks, adjusted following the AQR stage and on-site reviews. The framework consisted of three models. Two of them were essen ally satellite models -the large exposures (LE) model and the por olio-based model -providing inputs into the main bank balance sheet (BS) model. Rela onships between the models are illustrated in the fi gure below.
The diff erence of the current NBU approach as compared to the stress tests conducted in 2014 was the separa on of all exposures into three categories: sovereign and parastatals, large exposures, and the remaining exposures. Large exposures were defi ned as those above UAH 200 million or 5% of the bank's regulatory capital (RC), whichever was smaller. All loans of the bank, as well as its posi ons in fi xed income securi es sa sfying the aforemen oned size criteria, excluding sovereign exposures, were analyzed by means of a separate excel model. Financial performance of the bank's large borrowers was modelled over the forecast period of 2015-2017. Loan migra ons to/from the non-performing (NPL) category and the corresponding change in loan loss provisions were then es mated. All other exposures that did not qualify as large were modelled on a por olio basis, using econometric techniques to forecast loan migra ons and changes in provisions. The prac ce of analyzing large exposures on an individual basis is not common among na onal regulators, partly due to signifi cant resource and me requirements. Conduc ng individual stress-tes ng of large exposures by the NBU was important due to:
1. High concentra on of large exposures in banks' por olios; 2. Concerns about lending to related par es; 3. Diff erences in borrowers' credit ra ngs and overall loan quality across banks; 4. Low level of ownership structure transparency.
Modelling large exposures on an individual basis allowed accoun ng for dispari es in asset and collateral quality across Ukrainian banks.
Exposures stress tested on a por olio basis
In order to compose rela vely uniform groups of borrowers with similar characteris cs, the loan por olio was structured into sub-por olios according to the diagram below.
Exposures to the public sector and parastatals were not stress tested. Loans to other corporate clients (not classifi ed as large) and households were stress tested on a por olio basis.
Figure 3: Relationship between the three stress test models
The NBU used mul -factor ordinary least squares linear regression models to forecast changes in NPL shares for each of the six exposure segments (UAH/FX; other corporate/mortgages/other retail). Change in share of NPLs was the dependent variable and changes in macroeconomic indicators -the explanatory variables. The macroeconomic factors used included real GDP, CPI, credit and deposit interest rates in na onal and foreign currencies, UAH/USD exchange rate, nominal wage, and unemployment rate. Regression parameters were es mated based on quarterly data collected over the 2006-2014 period. Projec ons of NPL share changes for each segment were then applied to the actual levels of NPL shares at each bank. For loans having migrated into the NPL category, historical provisioning levels (as confi rmed or re-es mated by the AQR) were used, but not less than specifi ed minimal levels (55%-70%).
Stress tes ng large exposures
The framework for stress tes ng large exposures was determined by NBU regula ons, based on Basel principles, as well as interna onal prac ces in stress tes ng.
According to NBU regula ons, there are fi ve credit quality categories, with the fourth and fi h categories deemed nonperforming. Based on the AQR, large exposures were fi rst classifi ed as either performing (going concern) or non-performing (gone concern). Only loans that fell into the fi rst to fourth categories were stress tested, with loans from the fi h category retained as part of the loan por olio throughout the 2015-2017 period with adjustments for exchange rate changes. According to Resolu on No. 23, 1 a failure to meet certain regulatory requirements (e.g., mely submission of fi nancial statements) may result in a downgrade of a going concern loan to the fourth category. This way, the fourth category was also stress tested so as to avoid exclusion of essen ally performing loans.
According to NBU regula ons, a loan's probability of default (PD) is determined by its credit quality category, taking into account forward looking qualita ve and quan ta ve factors which defi ne the borrowers' ability to repay debt during the loan contract. The credit quality category in its turn is determined by a combina on of two criteria -the fi nancial class of the borrower and its debt service discipline. The fi nancial class of the borrower is based on its fi nancial state (represented by relevant fi nancial ra os). Debt service discipline is determined by registered meliness/delinquency in interest and principal repayments as well as ability to service debt.
Projec ng the borrowers' fi nancial state over the 2015-2017 period implied assigning them to one of nine classes based on the value of their integral indicators (es mated as a linear combina on of certain fi nancial ra os) within the ranges specifi ed for each industry and borrower size. In order to calculate the fi nancial ra os used to arrive at the integral indicator, the borrowers' fi nancial performance was modeled based on data for the 2013 and 2014 full fi scal years and the fi rst quarter of 2015. The following major assump ons were made: • Changes in balance sheet items are driven by relevant income statement items.
• Change of forecasted debt amount is determined by debt amor za on and funding needs (es mated as short-term loans).
• Projec ons are solely based on historic data, excluding any future income/expenses related to implementa on/ termina on of business projects, op miza on ini a ves and/or new client acquisi ons.
A borrowers' debt service discipline for 2015-2017 was es mated based on the projected cash fl ows for each period and scheduled amounts of debt repayments. In case of es mated cash fl ow defi ciency, debt service discipline was expected to deteriorate, but not more than 1-2 notches below the current level: one notch-for regular borrowers, two notches for highrisk profi le borrowers.
In es ma ng default probabili es, the following qualita ve factors were also taken into account: the availability of audited fi nancial statements, risk profi le, and history of business ac vity. When evalua ng the risk profi le of a borrower, measures such as debt to sales ra o and the number of employees were considered.
Following Resolu on No. 23 and Basel principles, Loan loss provisions (LLP) were es mated at the level of expected losses (EL) from credit opera ons, determined by the size of exposure at risk, probability of the borrower defaul ng, and the amount and quality of collateral pledged.
PD i -Es mated probability of default;
LGD i -Loss given default; Collateral value adj. -collateral value adjusted for liquidity risk and expenses for collateral enforcement and selling.
The stress tes ng methodology allowed the use of consolidated fi nancial statements for borrowers which were part of larger business groups, moving toward a broader understanding of the risks per nent to those borrowers.
Under the NBU stress tes ng approach, credit quality and default probability of a corporate borrower were largely infl uenced by the borrower's fi nancial standing, as is the typical prac ce in stress tes ng exercises. This way, the regulator analyzed the company's ability to internally generate cash fl ow for debt servicing purposes, rather than simply recognize the meliness of payments (debt service discipline).
Bank model: BS and Profi t and loss projec ons
For the purpose of stress-tes ng, forecasts of banks' fi nancial statements (balance sheet and P&L statement) were made covering three years -2015, 2016, and 2017 . A key assump on underlying the stress tes ng methodology was that of the fi xed balance sheet and business mix. Both the asset structure and the funding structure of the banks would remain unchanged over the me horizon of the exercise. It was assumed that assets and liabili es that matured within the forecast period would be replaced with similar fi nancial instruments in terms of type and credit quality. Thus, balance sheet changes would only be driven by:
• Exchange rate changes (Assets, Liabili es);
• Asset quality changes (Assets);
• Irrevocable off -balance sheet credit facili es drawdown for large (Assets) borrowers;
• Retained earnings changes from income/loss in the period (Equity).
It was assumed that over the stress tes ng horizon, the banks would refrain from paying out dividends to their shareholders and/or repaying their subordinated debt.
The income statement forecast included loan loss provisions charges, es mated using the satellite models (individually for large exposures and on a por olio basis for all other exposures), as well as other income/expense items. An adjustment for interest rate sensi vity gap, interest rates pass-through eff ect, and correc ons for one-off items were made. Incorpora ng the pass-through eff ect in the model allowed accoun ng for diff erences in interest rate movements across various assets and liabili es. Applica on of a gap model accounted for the risks arising from a mismatch in the rate sensi vity of the bank's assets and liabili es.
The gap eff ect was taken into account for assets and liabili es which matured (fi xed rate instruments) or whose interest rates were repriced (fl oa ng rate instruments) over the short-term horizon of one year. All interest sensi ve assets and liabili es were allocated to separate " me buckets" depending on their maturity/ me of repricing (Blaschke et al (2001) ). The projected interest rate income refl ected repricing eff ects (changes in interest rates) for the new posi ons and changes in the reference rates for the fl oa ng rate items. A simplifi ed formula for calcula ng adjustment for interest rate sensi vity gap D is presented below. Bank model: es ma ng capital requirements
For each forecast period the amount of Tier 1 capital was es mated as the sum of Tier 1 capital from the previous period and net income in the current period, with certain adjustments. If Tier 1 ra o in any given period fell below the required threshold, a capital gap was iden fi ed. Total regulatory capital was es mated as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, minus deduc ons. According to Ukrainian banking regula ons, the amount of Tier 2 capital included in the regulatory capital should not exceed Tier 1 capital (Tier2 ≤ Tier 1). Many Ukrainian banks sa sfy Tier 2 requirements through issuance of subordinated debt. Over the forecast periods, the amount of subordinated debt was fi xed at the level reported as of 1 April 2015, adjusted for changes in foreign exchange rates (for debt denominated in foreign currency) and amor za on schedules (according to Ukrainian regula ons).
If the results demonstrated that Tier 1 capital and total regulatory capital were not suffi cient to absorb the shocks under the stress tes ng scenario, the NBU requested banks to submit recapitaliza on plans to meet minimum capital requirements. The schedule for submission of such plans and their implementa on was developed by the NBU in accordance with the IMF memorandum.
2 Minimal capital requirements and milestones under this agreement are outlined in the table below. Regulatory capital 5% 7%
IV. Future developments
The current NBU stress tes ng methodology allowed execu on of a thorough mul lateral analysis of the largest Ukrainian banks' fi nancial resilience, based on which ac on would be taken to strengthen capital adequacy. As economic condi ons evolve, the stress tes ng methodology will need to be updated and improved.
One area of further development is the addi on of adverse macroeconomic scenarios. In 2015, Ukrainian banks were stress tested based on a baseline scenario, which is in essence a projec on of the current state of the economy into the forecasted period. In the future, it will be necessary to introduce more scenarios, including adverse and severely adverse scenarios, as well as to test the fi nancial system for specifi c shocks, the impact of which could be material.
Inclusion of other types of risks (liquidity, market, etc.) into the stress tes ng exercise, either together with the solvency test or as separate exercises, would be highly benefi cial for a more comprehensive understanding of fi nancial ins tu ons' resilience to poten al shocks.
The specifi city of Ukraine's fi nancial system, which is characterized by a rela vely small interbank market, prac cally nonexistent securi es markets, and a high concentra on of banks' asset por olios in tradi onal lending to corporate and retail clients, has infl uenced the design of the stress test. As the system evolves, more sophis ca on will be required within the stress tes ng models.
As Ukraine moves towards higher transparency and convergence with interna onal banking standards, more disclosures regarding stress tes ng methods, as well as stress test results, will be required. Those issues remain sensi ve for the banking community and the transi on would need to be gradual and prudent.
V. Conclusions
This paper gives a review of the stress tes ng methodology that has been developed by the NBU in coopera on with the IMF for the purpose of assessing robustness of the local banking sector. The stress tes ng framework incorporated experiences and prac ces of foreign regulatory authori es and suprana onal organiza ons responsible for fi nancial stability. Building on the large body of scien fi c research covering various aspects of the stress tes ng process, NBU adapted its methodology for idiosyncrasies present in the local economic and business environment. Being forward-looking by design, it focused on es ma ng expected losses on large exposures por olios. Moreover, in certain aspects the stress tes ng approach allowed analysis of consolidated fi nancial statements for borrowers which were part of larger business groups, thus moving towards a broader understanding of the risks per nent to those borrowers.
Under the NBU stress tes ng approach, credit quality and default probability of a corporate borrower were largely infl uenced by the borrower's fi nancial standing. This way, the regulator analyzed the company's ability to internally generate cash fl ow for debt servicing purposes, rather than simply recognize the meliness of payments. Such an approach allowed to focus on the viability and sustainability of the borrower's business and proved more reliable in terms of evalua ng credit quality.
In order to account for borrower characteris cs infl uencing credit risk, the methodology broadened the use of qualita ve factors. Factors evaluated included the borrower's staff size, years opera ng, and audit of the fi nancial statements.
The decision to stress test large borrowers of banks on an individual basis proved jus fi ed. Modelling the borrowers' fi nancial performance over a 3-year horizon allowed assessment of their capacity to service and repay their loans, thus giving a more realis c picture of a par cular bank's NPL rate across a large exposures por olio. These, and other addi ons and modifi ca ons to the current NBU stress tes ng methodology, helped improve the quality of the analysis and subsequent recommenda ons. But it is a work in progress; as the Ukrainian fi nancial system evolves, stress tes ng models and approaches will need to be further updated. Economic ups and downs are inevitable, adverse shocks are unpredictable, and no tool, however sophis cated, can fully guard against them. Despite these facts, stress tests represent a reliable compass for naviga ng us towards the safe shores of fi nancial stability. They are well worth befriending.
